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Politics and Administration EssayIntroduction186, 207, 221?Power scramble between the pro-democratic and pro-conservatism One of the reasons that led to such a tragic end for Tiananmen Movement is the power grapple between the two camps of leaders, pro-democratic (Former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist ships company, Zhao Ziyang) and pro-conservatism (Deng Xiao Ping). In 2009, a memoir was published based on audiotapes recorded by Zhao Ziyang, called Prisoner of the State The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang, he mentioned that he didnt want to be a General Secretary who opens fire on the tribe. From this, we could clearly tell by that time, Zhao differed in opinion from Deng and another(prenominal) conservative leaders, like Li Peng on how to handle the student movement, i.e. whether to pursue a peaceful or a military solution. http//blog.foolsmountain.com/2009/06/03/tiananmen-1989-a-need-for- talk-20-years-later/ One very crucial turning point that we know is that by that time, the CCP General Secretary made a scheduled official visit to North Korea, which turned turn up to be a bad decision at the time of turmoil this was because on April twenty-sixth CCP Central issued an editorial on Peoples Daily in the absence of Zhao Ziyang, which was highborn Uphold the flag to unam largeuously oppose any turmoil, denouncing that the patriotic student movement as a turmoil ignited by an extremely junior-grade handful of opportunists. http//www.alliance.org.hk/64/6420/?page_id=521According to Wu Jiaxiang, a former aide and a leading political scientist in Beijing, Zhao Ziyang, before leaving for North Korea on April twenty-first, had instructed that no politburo meeting should be held in his absence but other CCP leaders, likle Yang Shankun Li Peng immediately convened a CCP Expanded Poliburo Meeting, then reported to Deng Xiaoping with meeting opinions, and then borrowed Deng Xiaopings address in stating that CCP should not fear bloodshed .And in Zhao Zhiyangs self account, recorded by Yang Jisheng, he claimed that it was li Ximing Chen Xitong who contacted Wan Li on the night of April 21st in request of convening a commissar meeting that Wan Li relayed the info to Li Peng. Later, according to ________, Li Peng convened the meeting on the night of 24th, reported it to Deng Xiaoping on 25th, and was authorized to relay Dengs opinions to communist cadres and that Li Peng took advantage of the occasion to draft a newspaper commentary for publication on April 26th. By the time Zhao returned to China after the scheduled visit, he found it was just too late to remedy the situation as hostilities between the government and the people have been greatly aggravated.Other than the mis-communication over the Peoples Dailys editorial, we may gain further insights into the power struggle between the party leaders by taking a look at a previous document obtained by CNN and written by Bao Tong, a close aide to Zhao Ziyang, describ ing in detail the events leading up to the crackdown on student protests in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. September 25, 1989 buster Hu Yaobang died on April 15, soon after which the student demonstrations began. I was extremely worried. comrade Xiaoping pointed out in his speech on April 25 that the overwhelming priority in China is constancy I completely agreed with his point I as well as wanted to maintain stability and prevent turmoil. Specifically, I wanted to make an effort to reduce tensions and to avoid precipitating the tension into clashes. The Peoples Daily April 26th editorial, in my view, was harsh in language and lacked analysis and persuasiveness I had my reservations about it. On May 19 and 20, the Central Committee announced the decision to dart the military into Beijing and declare martial law in my heart, I believed we made a terribly wrong move I was afraid that we would be trapped in a very difficult situation, riding a tiger, hard to get-off.The Central Standing Committee collectively criticized Comrade Zhao Ziyang I mat it was unfair. 1.1 It was I who first informed Comrade Ziyang that the April 26th editorial had aggravated the confrontational mood of students and people who had previously appropriaten a neutral position. Comrade Ziyang returned to Beijing from North Korea on April 30th. As soon as he returned, I reported to him as follows Students have been demonstrating in the streets since April 27th. There were so umpteen of them that it was impossible to blockade there were also lots of onlookers following them. Some government officials sympathized with the demonstrations. There were signs that the incident was escalating and expanding there were a great number of students and others who resented the April 26th editorial and believed that it was hostile towards them. I spoke about my opinion of the editorial the positive side of the editorial was that it presented Comrade Xiaopings thoughts that China must maintain sta bility and must not fall into turmoil.However, the editorial was written in a very harsh tone, did not adequately present reasons and lacked analysis. It also did not perplex into consideration the acceptance of people who were previously neutral. Since there were so many people who believed that the editorial was hostile to them, it was obvious that the editorial did not express its ideas clearly. Comrade Ziyang did not express his own opinions at that time. After a few days, he said to me It seems that there are flaws in the editorial. Comrade Ziyang certainly suppose his opinions in his own way, but it was I who first reported to him about the editorial with this point of view. http//edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/22/tiananmen.document.01/ Students Uncollective ActionsAs discussed above, power struggle among the party leaders is one of the factors in leading to the unwanted tragedy of the June 4th Movement, but as I argue down below, the chaotic and irregular inter nal management of various student movements are by nature underlying factors to the tragedy. After the April 27 demonstration, the government commenced to open up dialogues with students, and the government seemed to take the initiative to adopt a more positive approach towards the student movement. The governments willingness to concede and negotiate have lit up the hope for the majority of students that the unblemished student movement might come to a peaceful end(Source Book) Yet, almost by the same time, the leadership and organization of the movement among the student leaders became problematic.not only did the student movement organizations hold different points of views towards the movement strategies, some of the student leaders also paid no respect to organizational claims, and a great deal often instead, they themselves acted on behalf of their organizations. One fine example would be the case of Zhou Yongjun, who was the president of Beijing Autonomous Federation. He he lped organize another big demonstration on May 4. However, without any consent from his fellows and colleagues, he announced the end of class strike without a clear resolution within the leadership. http//www.standoffattiananmen.com/2009/04/people-of-1989-zhou-yongjun.htmlIn order to better describe the dividing powers among the student leaders during the late stages of June 4th Movement, Zhao (2001) simply grouped the student demonstrators by that time into three groups, which are called individually Dialogue Delegation Group, Beijing Students Autonomous Group and the so-called charismatic group http//site.ebrary.com.eproxy1.lib.hku.hk/lib/hkulibrary/docDetail.action?docID=10402626 As Zhao (2001) noted, the students that belonged to Dialogue Delegation Group were eager for the coming dialogue with the government.ReferencesGonzales, Eduardo, L. and Gillespie, C.G. (1994). Presidentialism and Democratic Stability in Uruguay. In J. J. Linz and A. 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